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How much poverty could HIPC reduce? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper reviews the development of the HIPC Initiative, then considers 
how much poverty could be reduced through debt relief.  Using a simple 
distribution function and measures of inequality, US one dollar a day 
poverty is estimated for the twenty-three countries.  We show that the HIPC 
countries account for relatively little of developing country poverty.  
Further, full debt cancellation would have a small impact on reducing 
poverty in most of the HIPC countries themselves. The paper reaches the 
conclusion that neither a distribution-neutral debt cancellation, nor 
transferring all debt payments to investment for faster growth would achieve 
the International Poverty Targets.  Therefore, debt relief must be combined 
with redistribution measures to achieve those targets. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The HIPC Initiative began in the mid-1990s as a scheme to reduce the debts of 
qualifying low-income countries. Over time poverty reduction emerged as a key element 
in the programme. This paper considers the extent to which HIPC debate relief would 
reduce poverty, and in particular, its contribution to meeting the International Poverty 
Target of a fifty percent reduction by 2015. 
The first section of the paper reviews the main aspects of the HIPC programme, and 
argues that on the face of it, the poverty impact seems rather small. From this we conclude 
that debt cancellation would be a more sensible policy. In the following section detailed 
calculations are made to estimate the decline in poverty in each HIPC country that might 
be fostered by debt cancellation. Our conclusion is that even debt cancellation would 
make relatively little contribution to achieving the international target for 2015. This leads 
us to advocate redistribution as the only practical policy to achieve the poverty goals. 
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A Review of the HIPC Initiative 
 
The Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative launched by the IMF and the 
World Bank in 1996 has quite a history behind it. As early as the beginning of the 1980s 
some argued that the accumulation of debt in many third world economies was increasing 
at alarming levels.1  Only after the meeting of G7 countries in Toronto in 1988, did heavy 
indebtedness among some of these countries gain international recognition. It took 
another eight years after the Toronto meeting for the international donor community to 
formulate an integrated proposal for action and a further two to three years to activate it.  
The mechanism eventually created for countries to qualify for and benefit from the 
HIPC initiative involved a complex web of criteria, conditions and phases. Under the first 
HIPC initiative the criteria for eligibility consisted of three elements. Countries are 
required to: 
a) be eligible for concessional assistance from ‘IDA-only’,2  
b) have their indebtedness at an ‘unsustainable’ level which cannot be remedied by 
traditional debt-relief mechanisms,3 and 
c) implement ‘sustained’ economic reform and poverty reduction programs approved 
by the IMF and the World Bank.  
On the basis of these criteria, forty-one countries might qualify for debt relief under 
the original HIPC framework.4  From the outset, the original HIPC initiative was 
criticised by a wide range of organisations including UNDP, Oxfam, Christian Aid, Drop 
                                                          
1 Easterly (1999) and Hanlon (2000) have pointed out that a considerable part of the debt stock of 
today's heavily indebted economies started to accumulate in the 1970s, although they offer 
substantially different arguments on the causes of the debt accumulation. 
2 Their per capita income level is required to be $900 or lower 
3 The thresholds for debt sustainability are well known. Therefore we do not repeat them here. For 
details see, UNDP (1999), IMF & IDA (1999). 
4 Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo DR, Congo R, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Lao PDR, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, São Tomé Príncipe, Senegal, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia. Overall 33 African, 4 Latin 
American and 4 Asian Countries. Among these, Angola, Kenya, Vietnam and Yemen are 
expected to achieve debt sustainability after receiving debt relief under traditional mechanisms 
(e.g. through Paris Club or other bilateral agreements). Although Lao PDR in many HIPC related 
documents is indicated not to be seeking for debt relief under HIPC initiative, in the ‘HIPC 
Initiative Country Implementation Status Notes’ of 11 May 2001, it is indicated that the country 
has reached a new three-year PRGF arrangement and I-PRSP with the IMF and the Bank and that 
the authorities in the country '…are still in the process of studying the advantages and the 
disadvantages of requesting HIPC relief…' . 
 5
the Debt, Jubilee 2000, Eurodad and Cafod. Among them a consensus has emerged on 
three major aspects of HIPC. 
First, the original HIPC initiative offered too little to too few and too late. The most 
important factors for this were the criteria for debt sustainability and the conditionality 
accompanying debt relief. The thresholds for debt sustainability were especially 
problematic.  In the view of Oxfam (1999a), the export-based thresholds came from the 
experience of debt relief and scheduling processes of the early 1980s for middle-income 
Latin American economies. It would be unlikely that the same criteria would be 
appropriate for the HIPC economies. The absence of a clear and analytical justification for 
these thresholds for low-income countries suggested a degree of arbitrariness in their 
selection.  High thresholds acted to limit the size of debt relief, as well as restrict the 
number of countries that might qualify. 
 The prolonged negotiations among multilateral and bilateral donors and the efforts 
to create an integrated debt-reduction mechanism significantly delayed the delivery of 
debt relief.  ‘Policy conditionality’ generated further lags in the process. In addition to 
delays associated with eligibility and qualification,5 so-called slippages in implementation 
of economic reforms created further postponements and hindered many countries in 
reaching their decision points.  For example, delays for Nicaragua were attributed to 
slippages in the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) program. Similar 
problems were expected for the Gambia.6  Program implementation in Côte d’Ivoire was 
found ‘off-track’ in 2000. Therefore, the decision point for this country was postponed to 
the last quarter of 2001.7 The sluggish progression as a result of policy conditionality 
worsened due to the large the number of conditions included in these programs. 8  
 Second, the HIPC lacked an explicit linkage with human development and poverty 
reduction. To correct this, alternative proposals to HIPC made by UNDP, Eurodad, 
Oxfam, Cafod, and other organisations. These proposals stressed the need for a closer link 
                                                          
5 Countries were expected to implement policies of poverty reduction and growth facility (PRGF) 
and poverty reduction strategy for three years after qualifying for debt relief. Towards the end of 
that period, they would reach the ‘decision point’ when they were considered for a Paris Club 
'stock-of debt operation'.  At this point it would be decided if debt sustainability would be 
achieved at the ‘completion point’ (three years after the decision point). If not, additional debt 
relief would be provided. 
6 See, ‘HIPC Initiative Country Implementation Status Notes’ prepared by the staffs of the IMF 
and the World Bank, September 2000. 
7 See, ‘HIPC Initiative Country Implementation Status Notes’ prepared by the staffs of the IMF 
and the World Bank, September 2000 and May 2001. 
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between debt relief and social development indicators: poverty levels and human 
development indicators on education and health. Creation of mechanisms to direct 
resources released by debt relief into social expenditure, especially poverty reduction, was 
seen by these organisations as vital for the effectiveness of debt relief.9  Thus, what began 
as a limited debt reduction scheme increasingly took on the role of a poverty-reduction 
programme. 
 Third, the initiative was not supported by resources adequate to fulfil its promises. 
Generation of sufficient resources for HIPC initiative has been closely linked to the 
differing degrees of political support from donor countries. While the UK and the Nordic 
countries strongly supported substantial debt reduction and cancellation from the outset, 
others, especially Germany, Japan and Italy remained lukewarm. In the late 1990s, the 
reluctance of the latter group, notably that of Germany, reversed in favour of ‘deeper and 
earlier debt relief’. 
 Modification to the original HIPC initiative came in 1999 as a result of increasing 
pressures from debt-campaign groups.  The debt sustainability criterion, under the so-
called 'enhanced HIPC initiative', was re-redefined.10  The stages in the debt relief process 
were also slightly modified.  The three years of policy implementation after reaching the 
decision point was reduced to ‘at least’ a full one-year contingent on a Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility (PRGF) and a Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme (PRSP) before 
reaching the completion point. 
As of June 2001, five years after the initiation of HIPC, only two countries, Uganda 
and Bolivia, reached their completion points under the enhanced framework.  Twenty-two 
countries reached the less arduous ‘decision point’. In nominal terms, debt relief for these 
countries overtime was estimated to be about US$34 billion. This corresponds to US$20 
billion reduction in net present value terms. As a result, external indebtedness of these 
countries would be reduced by two-thirds on average, while debt service would fall by 
                                                                                                                                                                              
8 For example, Tanzania had 157 policy conditions in its I-PRSP while Benin had 111 (UNESCO 
2001). 
9 UNDP, for instance, called for the creation of a 'National Partnership Facility', while Oxfam 
suggested that 'a human development window' should be opened within HIPC debt relief process 
to facilitate the transfer of resources for poverty reduction and social development purposes. 
Cafod argued for 'feasible net revenue approach' in estimating debt sustainability levels. The 
approach involves estimating debt relief after deducting minimum levels of expenditure on human 
development sectors (education, health etc.) from relevant sums. 
10 Accordingly, external debt-export ratio is reduced to 150 per cent and debt service-export ratio 
to 15-20 per cent on a net present value basis. For very open economies with 30 per cent or more 
 7
one-third after HIPC relief and relief by other mechanisms. Average relief generated was 
estimated to be around 1.2 per cent of HIPC GDPs (World Bank, 2001).  It should be 
obvious that this level of debt relief would have little impact on either growth or poverty 
reduction (see discussion below). 
Details of estimated debt relief by countries is shown in the annex Table A.  Five 
more heavily indebted economies were expected to reach their completion point by the 
end of 2001.11 For the remaining sixteen, the process was still uncertain in mid-2001, 
although the likely completion points, according to the World Bank and the IMF, would 
be 2002.  Looking at the data on the distribution of debt relief in Table 1b among the 
decision point countries prompts two comments. First, there was a concentration in the 
distribution of debt relief in absolute value.  Four countries, Nicaragua, Zambia, Tanzania 
and Mozambique, account for approximately fifty per cent of the total relief in net present 
value terms. Second, in relative terms the shares of Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé & Príncipe, 
Zambia and Guyana were larger when measured on the basis of total savings accruing to 
each country as a percentage of their national output. 
The availability of resources remained a major concern under the enhanced HIPC 
initiative.  Although all of the G7 countries promised to cancel one hundred percent of the 
bilateral debt owed to them, their contributions to HIPC Trust Fund, which finances 
multilateral HIPC relief, remained inadequate and less than pledges. Thus, the concerns 
were justified given that the multilateral component accounted for fifty per cent of the 
debt relief under HIPC initiative. In 1999 in Cologne, members of the G7 group agreed to 
provide substantial debt relief for twenty countries by 2000. Nevertheless, only some 
relief was provided for less than half of the countries targeted (see UNESCO 2001).  
 
 
 
Poverty Levels in the Decision Point Countries: Method and Estimates  
 
  
In this section we outline the method we used in estimating poverty levels in the 
decision point countries and discuss the results before setting off to explore the impact 
HIPC debt relief may assume in reducing it. While there are poverty estimates based on 
                                                                                                                                                                              
export to GDP ratio, a lower external debt to export ratio is accepted if the fiscal revenue to GDP 
ratio is more than 15 per cent. 
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surveys for some of the HIPC countries, for our purpose they suffer from a number of 
deficiencies.  First, surveys can be unreliable under the best of circumstances, since they 
suffer from sampling bias, are carried out at one point in time, and seek information that it 
is in the interest of the respondent to misrepresent.12  Second, for the HIPC countries they 
do not provide a time series.  Third, they frequently prove to be inconsistent with national 
accounts data (Weeks 1997).  Since our exercise is to link poverty to per capita income, 
the latter is a serious problem. 
In place of survey results, we follow Karshenas (2001) and estimate poverty levels 
on the basis of per capita income and a specific distribution function.13  The function we 
chose is the Pareto distribution.  This function has the well-known property of generating 
considerable inaccuracy at the extremes of the distribution.  This problem does not affect 
our use of the function, since almost all the calculations fall within the middle percentiles.  
Using the function, the distribution of current income conforms to the following two-
parameter function: 
(1)  Yi = Ahi
α 
Each country’s distribution differs by the degree of inequality (the parameter α) 
and the scalar A, which is determined by overall per capita income.  Thus, 
(2)  A = βYpc 
 and 
(3) Yi = βYpchiα 
 Total income is, by definition, 
(4) Z = mΣβYpchiα  for 1 = 1,2...100, defined across percentiles. 
 If the poverty line is Yp = P, we can solve for the percentile in which it falls, which 
is also the percentage in poverty (N).14   
                                                                                                                                                                              
11 Benin, Burkina Faso, Guyana, Mozambique and Tanzania 
12 For a discussion, see Karshenas (2001) and Sender (forthcoming). 
13Non-technically, the poverty estimation can be explained as follows.  Consider the special case 
of a country with a per capita income of US$ 365 and a normal distribution around the mean.  In 
this case, the poverty share would be fifty percent of the population.  The more skewed the 
distribution, the greater the poverty share.  The specifics of the skewedness are determined by the 
distribution function. 
14 A characteristic of this distribution function is that the two parameters, a and b, are not 
independent of each other.  This characteristic does not affect our calculations in the next section, 
because we use the function only for the initial period’s income.  For more detail, see Dagdeviren, 
van der Hoeven and Weeks (2001). 
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(5) hp = N = [P/βYpc](1/α) 
 We use the poverty line adopted in the International Poverty Targets, of one US 
dollar per day.  With P established, the only unknown in the formula is the distribution 
parameter α.  This parameter is estimated in each case from each country’s Gini 
coefficient.15  Table 1a provides the poverty estimates generated by this method, for 1990, 
1995 and 1999. The first column gives the Gini coefficient, columns two through four 
show per capita income in constant US dollars of 1995, and five through seven the 
implied level of poverty.  In the penultimate column is the percentage point decrease in 
poverty associated with a one percent increase in per capita income, and the final column 
reports the elasticity of the poverty share with respect to per capita income.16  The 
absolute value of the elasticity of poverty with respect to per capita income varies 
negatively the degree of inequality, verifying the generalisation that initial inequality is a 
constraint on poverty reduction through growth.17  For example, Madagascar and Rwanda 
have almost the same per capita income, but poverty is more growth elastic in the latter 
because of its much lower inequality.  Table 1b repeats the same exercise using the 
purchasing power parity (PPP) measure of per capita income.  The across-the-board 
higher per capita incomes have little impact on the elasticity of poverty with respect to 
growth, though they result in lower poverty declines for a one percent rise in per capita 
income due to the algebra of calculation. 
 
 
 
 
The HIPC Relief and Poverty Reduction 
 
A casual search on the HIPC on the Internet produces around twenty thousand hit-
marks.  Of the issues debated and discussed in relation to HIPC initiative, perhaps the 
most controversial was its impact on poverty.  When assessing the significance of HIPC 
relief for poverty reduction, one should consider its poverty reducing potential within the 
context of the overall poverty levels in the developing world.  More specifically, one may 
                                                          
15 The Gini coefficient is a measure that can be calculated for any distribution function.  For any 
value of the Gini there is a unique value for α. 
16 That is, the percentage change in the poverty share is divided by the percentage change in per 
capita income, 1990-1999. 
17 There is a rather perverse exception to this. For countries with very low per capita incomes, 
greater inequality reduces poverty by bringing some of the population above the poverty line. 
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wish to see the contribution of HIPC initiative to the DAC target of halving the poverty 
levels in the developing world by 2015. Given the notoriously infrequent, imprecise and 
limited data on poverty in developing economies, this investigation requires a degree of 
speculation.  Before considering the issue for the HIPC countries alone, we can see from 
Table 2 that these countries account for a quite small part of world poverty.  
 Table 2 (in two parts) provides an insight to poverty reduction. Using World Bank 
data for total developing world poverty18 and our estimates for the HIPC countries, the 
latter accounted for four to six per cent of the total poverty in the developing world in the 
1990s when poverty is measured on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP) terms.19  
In constant US dollar terms, nine to twelve per cent of the developing world poverty was 
in HIPC countries. Whatever measure is used, the contribution of the HIPC initiative to 
the international poverty reduction goal is small even if we assume that the initiative 
succeeds in halving poverty in these countries.  We show below that HIPC would fail to 
achieve even this.  
 The low global impact on poverty is not an argument against the initiative, if HIPC 
were an essential part of the exit from high levels of poverty, which it may be for many 
countries, especially those in the sub-Saharan.  There, according to our PPP based 
estimates, a large portion of the population live below one dollar-a-day poverty line. The 
data on illiteracy rate, under-nourishment, mortality rate and access to sanitation (Table 4) 
complements our poverty data in reflecting the level of human deprivation in these 
countries; a third of the population is under-nourished, almost half illiterate, half has no 
access to adequate sanitation facilities, and under five mortality rate is 26 times higher 
than in high income countries. 
Assessing the poverty reduction impact of the HIPC initiative on the qualifying 
countries is fraught with difficulties. Two broad factors are responsible for the complexity 
and difficulty. The first involves debt relief as such and its impact on poverty reduction. 
The time period over which the relief would be realised is not certain for some countries, 
as the policy implementations must satisfy the World Bank and the IMF.20 Further, debt 
relief need not imply release of resources for poverty reduction and other social goals, 
                                                          
18 The estimates of Chen and Ravallion reported in the World Development Report 2000-2001. 
19 The measure of per capita income is usually regarded as more appropriate for cross-country 
comparisons than exchange rate converted measures. 
20 It should be noted that there is a potential conflict of interest in the arrangement by which the 
World Bank and the IMF, who are the major HIPC creditors, deciding on whether governments 
qualify for debt relief from the same organisations. 
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even if governments wish to do this. In the cases in which countries did not fulfil their 
debt service obligations fully before HIPC relief, resources released by HIPC will be 
limited.  Some governments have been borrowing in order to maintain their debt services.  
For such countries HIPC debt relief will reduce the borrowing requirement but not free 
resources for poverty reduction.  
 Secondly, the relationship between HIPC debt relief and poverty reduction should be 
considered in a dynamic context. There are many factors that need consideration for a 
proper analysis.  Mechanisms of poverty reduction, through public spending, subsidies or 
employment generating projects, must be specified.  Some forms of public spending, on 
education and infrastructure, might not have an immediate effect on poverty levels, but 
require a gestation period before taking effect.  Accounting for this possibility would 
make estimations even more complicated. Also, general economic performance and a 
government’s policy framework should be taken into account to assess the sustainability 
of poverty reduction from HIPC debt relief.  For these reasons, our estimates of potential 
HIPC poverty reduction take quite simple and straightforward scenarios. 
Prior to a fully-fledged analysis, one can gain an intuitive understanding of its 
potential for poverty reduction.  Consider the following questions: 1) what is the 
relationship between the distribution of HIPC relief and the level of poverty in each 
country;  2) what are the mechanisms for poverty reduction and to what extent will 
resources released under HIPC be sufficient to sustain these mechanisms;  and 3) 
assuming that the relief provided by the HIPC will have an indirect impact to reduce 
poverty, will that be sustainable at least in the medium term. 
The answer to the first question is suggested by looking back at Table 3. A 
comparison of the distribution of debt relief on a per capita basis and corresponding 
poverty shares of decision-point countries shows that the former does not correlate with 
the latter. Tanzania accounts for twenty per cent of the total poverty in the HIPC group, 
but receive ten times less debt relief in per capita terms than Guyana, whose poverty share 
is reported as tiny.  This is hardly surprising given that the main aim of the initiative has 
been to bring HIPC economies to a point at which they can maintain debt servicing 
without further assistance.  Indeed, in as far as the HIPC is a debt relief programme as 
such, there is no reason that it need be justified by its global poverty impact.  After 
inspection it cannot be so justified. 
The second question, the relationship between the mechanisms of poverty reduction 
and the resources released, leads to consideration of the poverty reduction strategy papers 
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(PRSP) required of the governments of the HIPC countries.  It is difficult to make a 
general evaluation of PRSPs, because there are great variations in the policies chosen to 
achieve the goals of growth and poverty reduction.  Despite this, one can highlight 
elements are common to almost all PRSPs.  PRSPs involve two sets of policies, that 
directly related to poverty reduction and that covering macro and meso policy.  The 
macroeconomic framework in most PRSPs repeats many of the standard policies found in 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programs. Commitment to low inflation and fiscal 
deficit reduction as well as the familiar ‘reforms’ of privatisation, trade liberalisation, 
capital liberalisation, and public sector ‘restructuring’ are common to almost all PRSPs.21  
The policies in directly linked to poverty reduction are of three types, those fostering rural 
development22, so-called institutional capacity building, and public expenditure.23 Finally, 
all PRSPs without exception define social spending as poverty reducing.24  
HIPC debt relief can operationally be linked to poverty reduction via social spending 
through the estimation of the expenditure facilitated by reducing debt, and comparing it to 
social needs.  The simplest way to do this would be to choose a spending level that would 
allow a HIPC country to achieve a target poverty reduction, such as the International 
Poverty Target of fifty percent. One would then compare actual spending with this 
benchmark and compare the difference with the debt reduction generated from the 
country’s HIPC agreement. 
Table 5 gives health and education spending for the decision point countries. These 
rates are compared with the spending levels for the same categories in the high-income 
countries. We assume that the share of social spending in GDP in high-income countries 
should be the minimum requirement for the HIPC group as far as the social spending 
component of the poverty reduction strategy is concerned.  It might be argued that the 
                                                          
21 In some, target rates are set for each of these components. Some countries have identified 
specific sectors such as agriculture and tourism as drivers of growth and expressed an intention to 
focus on these sectors to achieve their targets. Goals like increasing investment and public savings 
are also encountered among other growth promoting channels. 
22 The justification for this commonality seems to lie within the fact that poverty in the Least 
Developed Economies is predominantly a rural phenomenon. Moreover, rural development 
policies are expected to have direct or indirect affects on agricultural productivity that would 
foster economic growth and poverty reducing efforts. Specifically, rural development policies 
include measures to create or reinforce rural financial systems (e.g. savings and credit co-
operatives), maintain food security, increase agricultural productivity, provide technical assistance 
and training for farmers, fishers and agricultural workers.  
23 These reforms allegedly increase efficiency and improve management of public spending and 
debt, transparency and fiscal accountability, and reduce corruption. 
24 Included are expenditure on education, health and infrastructure (access to clean water, 
sanitation facilities, rural access roads, etc.). So-called prioritising is always emphasised. 
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high-income country percentages are much too high, given that those countries enjoy 
levels of education and health that HIPC countries could not achieve in decades.  This 
argument is too narrow.  If the international goal of dramatically reducing poverty will be 
achieved, it will be necessary for countries with high levels of poverty to spend at least as 
much on health and education proportionally as in countries where poverty is low.   
The estimates in Table 5 show that the savings generated are sufficient to cover the 
difference for both education and health in five countries out of eighteen (excluding those 
without data).  For the remaining thirteen countries, the savings are not even enough to 
cover the difference in health expenditure. Note that the data on savings to be generated 
through the HIPC debt relief reflects the total amount to be distributed over a period of 
time and that this time period is very long in many cases.25 Therefore, the impact of HIPC 
relief on social spending is likely to be small. 
This interpretation of the impact of HIPC relief does not generate an optimistic 
conclusion for poverty reduction. Perhaps more worrisome, it is not clear that HIPC debt 
reduction would achieve the more narrow goal of debt sustainability.  Early projections by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund indicate that the debt service levels 
will start to rise after 2003.  For Honduras, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Niger, Uganda and 
Zambia debt service due in 2005 after HIPC relief would be higher than what was paid in 
1999.26  Some countries will pay more in the short-term than they did previously even 
with the full application of HIPC. The limitations of HIPC debt relief in ensuring long-
term sustainability are acknowledged by both the IMF and Bank in a report published by 
the IMF and IDA (2001). The report points out that maintenance of debt sustainability 
depends on countries achieving a higher growth path, which itself requires overcoming 
lack of diversification in exports and production, dependency on capital imports, 
declining terms of trade, and protectionism in the North. 
 The relatively limited impact of HIPC suggests that the so-called international 
community would be better advised to cancel multilateral debts, just as several G7 
countries have cancelled bilateral debts. This proposal has acquired the status of an 
international demand by non-governmental organisations, politicians and academics.  
Perhaps associated with the growing support for debt cancellation, one finds on the 
                                                          
25 For instance, in the case of Bolivia, around 80 per cent of debt relief is projected to become 
effective in 15 years. See, PRSP for Bolivia (March, 2001). 
26 See World Bank (2001). Note, however, that their debt service-export ratio in 2005 is projected 
to remain under the threshold used for debt sustainability.  
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Internet a polemical27 paper entitled, ‘100 Percent Debt Cancellation?  A response from 
the World Bank and the IMF’ (World Bank and IMF 2001).  There might be sound 
reasons for not cancelling HIPC debts.  These are to be found in the paper.  While all 
contributions to the debate over debt relief should be considered on their merits, it is 
useful to invoke the principle of law that states that testimony that a person or 
organisation gives in its own self-interest carries less weight than testimony in which no 
obvious self-interest is involved.28   
It is typically argued by the World Bank and the IMF that a write-off would 
undermine the ability to lend to the poorest countries.  The capital base of the institutions 
would be reduced,  and it is unlikely that governments of developed countries would 
increase their contributions to replace the debt cancellation.  With the IBRD’s equity 
leveraged at ‘about 5:1’,29 ‘its capacity to lend would be reduced by $5 for every $1 
distributed to debt relief’ (World Bank & IMF 2001, p. 5).  In other words, a debt write-
off for poor countries would be bad for poor countries.  This is not a convincing 
argument.  If it were, it would argue against any debt relief, or for as little as possible.  
More fundamentally, it is useful to speculate whether the financial constraints on debt 
cancellation would prove so serious were the World Bank and the IMF to publicly 
champion its cause.  Were the leaders of those organisations to advocate debt 
cancellation, it is conceivable that the means to achieve it without reducing development 
lending could be found. 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 The paper qualifies as polemics overall, and this is epitomised by the sentence ‘Supporters of 
100 percent debt cancellation must be honest about the costs’ (p. 4).  One does not have to take 
offence easily to interpret this sentence as suggesting that the unspecified ‘supporters’ had not, to 
the date of the paper, been honest, making it necessary to advise them to be so. 
28 The paper makes it clear that 100 percent debt relief would not be in the self-interest of the 
IMF:  ‘Debt cancellation would…impair the Fund’s financial integrity’.  A similar interest is 
stated for the World Bank:  ‘it is likely that the write-off would result in a weaker equity capital 
position for the Bank…’ (p. 5). 
29 This is not a very compelling argument without more information.  This leverage ratio is far less 
than for ‘blue-chip’ private banks, and it might be possible to increase the World Bank’s leverage 
ratio without affecting its bond rating.    The maximum loan level prior to cancellation can be 
defined as Lo = αoE.  If the HIPC cancellation is equal to h, then the post-cancellation increase in 
the leverage ratio necessary such that Lo = L1 would be ∆α/α =α* = (1 – [Lo/Lo – h]), or one 
minus the inverse of the share of non-HIPC debt in total equity.  It is possible that this percentage 
is quite high, so α* is quite low. 
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 The basic arguments for debt cancellation are quite compelling. It would: 
1. do the job properly, for if partial debt relief is good for HIPC countries, then 
cancelling the debt would be better; 
2. avoid the delays, arbitrariness, and subjectivity associated with passing 
judgement on country qualifications for relief;30 and 
3. relieve the World Bank and the IMF of playing the role (like Santa Claus and 
the giving of presents) of deciding who has been good or bad, which has more 
than a hint of neo-colonialism in it. 
Debt cancellation is neither radical nor dangerous, but sensible and uncomplicated.  In the 
next section we use this sensible proposal as the benchmark for our estimates of the likely 
impact of debt relief on poverty reduction in the HIPC countries. 
 
 
Estimates of Poverty Reduction from Debt Write-off 
 
In this section we consider the poverty reduction in the HIPC scheduled countries 
that might be achieved were there a cancellation of all debt.  Our procedure is to consider 
the effect of debt cancellation directly on poverty and on poverty via growth.   
Table 6 provides the information to assess the question, would debt relief have a 
substantial impact on poverty in the HIPC countries.  For quick reference, the Gini 
coefficients are included along with the per capita incomes and implied poverty levels.  
Column four gives actual debt service paid as a proportion of national income, averaged 
over 1995-1999.  The last two columns require brief explanation.  External debt service 
reduces the national income distributed to the population, on the reasonable assumption 
that residents are not among the external creditors of the country.  If a country’s debt were 
completely cancelled, income to persons would rise by an amount equal to debt service, 
assuming none was taxed or went to undistributed profits.  We assume that the ‘debt 
bonus’ from cancellation accrues proportionately across all income groups.  That is, debt 
cancellation is treated as equivalent to a one-off distribution-neutral growth rate equal to 
the share of debt service in national income.  The appropriateness of this assumption of a 
distribution-neutral debt bonus will vary by country, but it provides an instructive 
                                                          
30 It is non-controversial that qualification is a process generating considerable delay.  We 
discussed above the arbitrariness of the qualifying debt-ratios.  Numerous studies have shown that 
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benchmark to assessing the impact of debt on poverty.  As in Table 1, we report both the 
absolute percentage point decline in poverty and the percentage fall in the share (both 
expressed as a positive number). 
One first notes that for all countries the percentage reduction in poverty is far less 
than the fifty percent set by the International Poverty Targets.  For only one country, 
Zambia, is the reduction in the poverty share greater than ten percent, and for eight of the 
twenty-three countries the decline is less than two percent (less than three percent for 
thirteen of the twenty-three).  There is a marked difference between the African countries 
and those in Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC).  Of the nineteen African countries, 
only four have debt bonus poverty declines greater than the LAC country with the 
smallest decrease (Honduras).  For some countries the limited impact of the debt bonus on 
poverty results from an unequal distribution of income.  For example, Rwanda with debt 
service of only 1.3 percent of national income, achieves a slightly higher debt reduction 
than Malawi with 4.9 of national income.  The general conclusion one can draw from 
Table 6 is that debt relief alone, even full debt cancellation would have a limited impact 
on reducing poverty in the HIPC countries, unless the debt bonus were distributed to those 
below the poverty line. 
 Tables 7 and 8 take a different but complementary approach to the issue of debt and 
poverty.  Table 8 takes the International Poverty target for 2015 for each country, income 
per head in 1995, and calculates the poverty reduction that would be achieved with 
various rates of per capita growth.  The table reports the per capita income that would 
reduce poverty to the target level and the required growth rate to reach this income per 
head.  The calculations are based on per capita income measured in 1995 US dollars, but 
the growth rates change only marginally if the purchasing power parity measure is used.  
The table shows that for per capita growth rates up to four percent per annum (much 
higher than for any of the twenty-three countries except Guyana, Mozambique and 
Uganda), for only one country is the share of poverty reduced by half by 2015.  It comes 
as no surprise that the country achieving the target, Rwanda, has the lowest degree of 
inequality by far.  Its Gini coefficient was 28.9, compared to 34.7 for the next lowest, 
Chad.  If somehow all of the HIPC countries grew at the ‘Asian Miracle’ rate of four 
percent per capita, the average short fall in poverty reduction (compared to the target) 
                                                                                                                                                                              
there is limited consistency across countries in judging whether conditionalities are met.  We 
would argue that this subjectivity is desirable, since each country’s circumstances are different.   
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would be eleven percentage points across African countries and ten percentage points for 
the four LAC countries. 
 The analysis of growth rates and poverty reduction is elaborated in Table 8, which 
analyses the likelihood of the countries achieving the target rates of per capita growth.  
The first column reports the average growth rate for each country, 1990-1999, and 
compares it to the target rate (column 2), yielding the ‘growth gap’ in column three.  The 
growth gap is quite daunting:  across the African countries, actual growth during the 
1990s was over seven percentage points below the rate that need be achieved during 
2000-2015 to reduce poverty by half.  For only three of the nineteen countries are the gap 
less than five percentage points.  For the LAC countries the gap is slightly lower, six 
percentage points.   
 The remaining columns calculate the rate of investment in national income that 
would be necessary to generate the target rate of growth.  This is done by applying the 
simple Harrod-Domar equation.  The net investment rate is estimated as follows:  1) by 
assuming values for the marginal capital-output ratio;  and 2) by assuming an arbitrary 
value for the average life of a homogeneous unit of capital (see notes to Table 8).  The 
assumed capital-output ratios are well below the observed values,31 but represent values 
that one would expect from countries at the level of development of the HIPC group.  In 
effect, we assume that via demand management or some unspecified efficiency gain 
typically attributed to ‘economic reform’, capital is employed close to its optimal rate.   
Defining our symbols: 
y = rate of growth of GDP, 
sg = gross investment share in GDP, 
sn = net investment share in GDP, 
d = share of depreciation in GDP, 
ki = average capital-output ratio (equal to the marginal), 
p = rate of population growth 
 We can write, 
 y = [(sg – d)/k]  
                                                          
31 Across the African countries, eliminating extreme values for Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda and Sao 
Tome & Principe, the 1995-1999 average capital output ratio was 2.9.  The values range from a 
high of six (Zambia) to a low of 1.3 (Malawi).  The 1995-1999 averages for the LAC countries are 
considerably higher than the 3-3.5 range, perhaps due to demand compression.  The calculations 
are based on data from World Development Indicators 2001, using our depreciation assumption. 
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 y = (sn)/k 
 If the rate of growth to achieve the poverty target is yt, then the necessary rate of 
investment is: 
  sn = kiyt  
   Columns five and six give the estimated net investment rates required to achieve 
the target rate of growth for the two values of the capital-output ratio, 2.5 and three for the 
African countries, and three and 3.5 for the LAC countries.  These two columns are 
followed by the estimates of the ‘actual’ capital-output ratios for each country, based on 
1995-1999 averages.  Column nine gives debt service as a percentage of GDP.  We 
assume that all the countries benefit from a complete debt write off, and that the debt 
bonus is entirely applied to net capital formation.  For example, Benin’s net investment 
would go from 12.2 or 11.4 to 14.8 or 14 percent of GDP.  The final two columns subtract 
the debt bonus augmented net investment share from the share required to reach the target 
rate of growth for the two capital-output ratios.  The numbers in these columns we call the 
investment-GDP gap after the debt write off (with a negative number indicating an 
investment short fall).  Of the twenty-three countries, only five would achieve the target 
rates of investment implied by fifty percent poverty reduction (with Nicaragua being a 
marginal case for a capital-output ratio of three).  These cases are noted by black-bordered 
cells.  The shaded cells indicate the countries for which debt relief makes the difference 
between achieving or not achieving the poverty target by 2015, of which there are four.  
These estimates demonstrate that debt relief, even a total debt write off, could not for 
most countries generate a rate of economic growth that would allow most HIPC countries 
to reach the international Poverty Target. 
 Our calculations allow us to reach two general conclusions: 
1. if the debt bonus from cancellation of total debt were distributed to the 
population in a distribution-neutral manner, the resulting poverty reduction would 
be relatively minor;  and 
2. if the debt bonus from cancellation of total debt were used entirely for 
investment, the resulting growth gain would allow very few of the HIPC countries 
to achieve the rate of growth that would meet the poverty targets, even under the 
most optimistic assumptions. 
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 The implication of these conclusions is that debt relief, especially partial debt 
relief, will be affective in reducing poverty if and only if it were combined with 
redistribution of the debt bonus and current income itself.32 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 While the HIPC Initiative is a step in the right direction to foster sustainable 
growth in low-income countries, it is a limited step which will a relatively minor impact 
on poverty levels except in a few qualifying countries.  However, there are practical and 
sensible policies of income and asset redistribution that could have a dramatic impact on 
poverty (Dagdeviren, van der Hoeven & Weeks 2001).  At this point, after much delay in 
delivery of HIPC relief, and the inadequacy of that relief for poverty reduction, the time is 
over due to place policies of redistribution at the centre of the development agenda. 
 
 
                                                          
32 For a detailed discussion of redistribution mechanisms, see Dagdeviren, van der Hoeven and 
Weeks (2001). 
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Table Annex Table A: Estimated Debt Relief under HIPC Initiative for Decision 
Point Countries 
 
 
 
Country 
 
HIPC 
Status 
 
NPV of 
Total Debt 
Relief 
(US$ Mns) 
    Nominal 
Debt 
Service 
Relief 
(US$ Mns) 
 
Total  
Savings 
Percent 
of GDP* 
Benin CP by 12/2001 265 460 1.2 
Bolivia CP in 06/2001 1302 2060 2.0 
Burkino Faso CP by 12/2001 398 700 1.4 
Cameroon floating 1260 2000 2.5 
Chad floating 157 260 … 
The Gambia floating 67 90 2.0 
Guinea floating 545 800 3.1 
Guinea-Bissau floating 416 790 12.8 
Guyana CP by 12/2001 585 1030 9.2 
Honduras floating 556 900 2.0 
Madagascar floating 814 1500 1.7 
Malawi  floating 643 1000 3.0 
Mali floating 523 870 1.8 
Mauritania floating 622 1100 4.5 
Mozambique CP by 06/2001 1970 4300 2.6 
Nicaragua floating 3267 4500 8.0 
Niger floating 521 900 2.4 
Rwanda floating 452 810 2.0 
São Tomé Príncipe floating 97 200 12.5 
Senegal floating 488 850 1.2 
Tanzania CP by 12/2001 2026 3000 1.3 
Uganda (*) CP in 05/2000 1003 1950 1.6 
Zambia floating 2499 3820 11.7 
Total relief provided/committed 20663 34430  
Source: The World Bank & IMF 
(*) World Bank (2001) 
CP: Completion Point 
